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INTRODUCTION 
Benjamin Harris watched as his appointed defense counsel, Murray 
Anderson, delivered a closing argument in his murder trial.1 Anderson 
began to verbally attack his own client, telling members of the jury 
Harris was a liar and a thief; Anderson continued that Harris had “in’s 
[sic] and out’s [sic] with several young women,” that “he drank 
intoxicating liquor a great deal[,]” and he is “a man who doesn’t have 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Thank you to my Georgia State University Law Review classmates for contributing to this Note, 
especially Meg Buice and Andrew Hazen. 
 1. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1437–38 (9th Cir. 1995). Harris was charged and 
found guilty of aggravated first-degree murder. Id. at 1435. Upon advice of counsel, Harris gave a 
statement to prosecutors claiming that he shot the victim, but only after his friend, a hired hit man, fired. 
Id. at 1435. Harris and the alleged hit man were tried separately, and the hit man was acquitted. Id. at 1434 
n.2. 
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the same moral code as we expect” because he belongs to “a class of 
men who don’t work and carry guns, regularly.”2 Likely most damning 
to his client’s murder charge, Anderson argued to the jury that Harris 
and his cohorts “kill people.”3 It is possible that defense counsel—
realizing that the jurors felt no sympathy for Mr. Harris—made a 
strategic decision to dehumanize his client. However, this theory 
appears less probable considering Anderson had three months to 
prepare for Harris’s trial, and Anderson only met with Harris for a total 
of 1 hour and 48 minutes during these months.4 Anderson had a list of 
thirty-two persons with knowledge of the murder, but interviewed only 
three witnesses.5 Further, Anderson failed to request an investigator to 
help interview witnesses.6 Not surprisingly, following his first-degree 
murder conviction, Harris petitioned for habeas corpus relief based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.7 
In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
a defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an 
“objective standard of reasonableness.”8 Harris argued the cumulative 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 1437–38 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted defense 
counsel’s statements attacked his own client’s veracity and “even his humanity.” Id. at 1437. 
 3. Id. at 1438 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit commented that this closing 
argument “left the jury little reason to empathize with Harris.” Id. It concluded that, “‘[these arguments] 
did not support a reasonable defense theory.’” Id. (quoting Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Blodgett, 853 F. 
Supp. 1239, 1267–68 (W.D. Wash. 1994)). 
 4. Id. at 1434–36. It appears Anderson was simply ineffective rather than a victim of ill-planned 
strategy. See id. at 1438. The Ninth Circuit actually addressed the strategic aspect of this closing argument 
and noted, “‘these arguments were beyond any discernible trial strategy, and were outrageous.’” Id. 
(quoting Blodgett, 853 F. Supp. at 1267–68). 
 5. Id. at 1435. 
 6. Id. According to Anderson’s billing statements, he consulted with his client for less than two hours 
over three months for a first-degree murder case. Id. at 1434–35. Police reports listed approximately thirty-
two persons with knowledge of the murder, nineteen of which testified at trial, and Anderson interviewed 
only three witnesses by himself. Id. Harris also alleged that Anderson made many other errors during the 
guilt phase of his trial that the Ninth Circuit did not address as thoroughly. Id. at 1438. These deficiencies 
included, among others: (1) “failure to investigate adequately Harris’s mental and emotional status;” (2) 
“failure to challenge the admissibility of Harris’s statements” regarding the events of the murder; (3) 
“failure to conduct proper voir dire;” (4) “failure to object to evidence;” (5) “failure to propose . . . jury 
instructions;” (6) “failure to raise or preserve meritorious issues in appellate proceedings;” and (7) 
Anderson’s “decision to call Harris to testify at trial.” Id. 
 7. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer, 64 F.3d at 1434. The district court granted Harris’s petition for habeas 
corpus relief. Id. at 1435. The court vacated his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. Id. 
The State appealed to the Ninth Circuit challenging the lower court’s ruling that many of Anderson’s 
actions or omissions during the case were deficient. Id. 
 8. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). For a critique of this standard, see Martin C. 
2
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impact of Anderson’s unreasonable “deficiencies prejudiced his 
defense” and right to a fair trial.9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed Harris’s 
habeas relief by adding defense counsel’s errors together; in fact, the 
court specifically noted, “[w]e do not need to decide whether these 
deficiencies alone meet the prejudice standard.”10 Although this seems 
logical, especially in the context of this case, Harris, here, received 
different Sixth Amendment protections than other defendants around 
the country.11 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects an 
individual’s fundamental right to a fair trial. 12  The United States 
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that entitlement to counsel 
plays a critical role in protecting this fundamental right.13 In Strickland 
                                                                                                                 
Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413 (1988). Calhoun quotes Judge Bazelon that “in 23 years 
on the bench . . . a great many—if not most—indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance 
of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment . . . .” Id. at 416 (quoting David L. Bazelon, The 
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973)). Judge Bazelon likens current court-
appointed protection to “little more than pro forma representation.” Id. 
 9. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer, 64 F.3d at 1438. Harris alleged defense counsel committed as many as 
eleven errors during and before his trial. Id. at 1435–38. The Ninth Circuit addressed some of the errors 
individually but focused on the accumulation of errors. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1439 (quoting Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992)). “By finding cumulative 
prejudice, we obviate the need to analyze the individual prejudicial effect of each deficiency.” Id. The 
Ninth Circuit continued: “Anderson’s performance was deficient in eleven ways, eight of them 
undisputed. We are compelled to find that they cumulatively prejudiced Harris’s defense. The court 
properly granted habeas relief.” Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998) (announcing ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims must be viewed “individually, rather than collectively”); Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 
F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that an attorney’s acts or omissions “that are not unconstitutional 
individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional violation”); Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 
147 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining “cumulative-error analysis evaluates only [the] effect of matters 
determined to be error, not [the] cumulative effect of non-errors”) (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 
F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). In an adversarial judicial system, “access to counsel’s 
skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the 
prosecution’ to which they are entitled.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942)). Because an attorney’s role is of vital importance, a person 
accused of a federal or state crime, with limited exceptions, has the right to have counsel appointed if one 
cannot be obtained. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30–31 (1972) (rejecting the contention that 
prosecutions of petty crimes, which may be tried without a jury, could be tried without a lawyer). 
3
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v. Washington, the Court announced a two-prong test to evaluate 
whether a convicted defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.14 In order to succeed on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) the 
“counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial.15 
In evaluating counsel’s alleged deficiency, the inquiry must be 
whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the 
circumstances.16 In evaluating the prejudice prong, courts require that 
“but-for” counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial likely would have 
been different.17 Unless a defendant affirmatively shows both deficient 
performance and a resulting prejudice, it cannot be said the defendant’s 
conviction occurred “from a breakdown in the adversary process that 
renders the result unreliable.”18 
Since the Court formed the foundation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in 1984, a circuit split has emerged on the issue of 
whether the first prong of the test requires appellate courts to review 
each of counsel’s errors individually or allows courts to consider 
counsel’s multiple errors as one whole claim.19 By permitting courts 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Supreme Court had already “recognized that the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 15. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. One author explained the current test for constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims as follows: “In the majority of cases, the defendant must prove that specific 
errors were unreasonable and prejudicial. That is, the errors were not within the broad range of acceptable 
strategic decisions, and they had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case.” Jeffrey 
Levinson, Note, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance of 
Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 157 (2001). 
 16. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.”). Courts must not apply hindsight because it “is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s 
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable.” Id. 
 17. Id. at 693–94 (“It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable 
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. . . . On the other hand, we believe that a defendant need not show 
that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. . . . The defendant 
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 18. Id. at 687. By meeting each prong, the defendant shows that counsel’s representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. 
 19. Forrest v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 342 F. App’x 560, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the applicability of the cumulative error doctrine in the context 
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). The Eleventh Circuit then went on to cast doubt on the 
4
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to consider multiple errors as one claim, a defendant may argue 
counsel committed multiple errors (although each one alone was not 
egregious enough to warrant a finding of deficient performance) that 
amounted to a cumulative deficiency below the Sixth Amendment 
standard.20 The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have taken a hostile 
stance toward cumulative deficiency claims, holding that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims must be viewed individually rather than 
collectively. 21  The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold the 
opposite and allow a defendant—like Harris—to prove he suffered 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on the cumulative effect of 
errors. These circuit courts ask whether the “multiple deficiencies have 
the cumulative effect of denying a fair trial to the [habeas corpus] 
petitioner . . . .”22 
This Note argues that courts need to allow defendants to prove they 
suffered ineffective assistance of counsel based on the cumulative 
effect of counsel’s alleged errors. If the court finds a multitude of 
errors played a role in denying the defendant his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel, the court should be able to consider them 
                                                                                                                 
cumulative deficiency doctrine by interpreting a Supreme Court case on ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims that was not Strickland. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 20. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). See also sources cited infra 
note 22. 
 21. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998) (announcing ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims “must be reviewed individually, rather than collectively”). This court took the time to cite 
multiple authorities in announcing this rule. See, e.g., Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352, 1364 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting a request to review the alleged errors of a trial court cumulatively rather than individually); 
Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1219–23 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering ineffective assistance claims 
individually rather than considering their cumulative impact). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held that an 
attorney’s acts or omissions “that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create 
a constitutional violation.” Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996). This holding 
mirrors the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jones v. Stotts, noting that, “cumulative-error analysis evaluates 
only effect of matters determined to be error, not cumulative effect of non-errors.” 59 F.3d 143, 147 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 22. Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1979). A “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
can turn on the cumulative effect of all of counsel’s actions.” Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d 
Cir. 1991). See also Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995) (defendant may 
demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions was prejudicial); Harris 
ex rel. Ramseyer, 64 F.3d at 1438 (recognizing that “prejudice may result from the cumulative impact of 
multiple deficiencies”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit totaled counsel’s alleged 
errors, even before Strickland. See, e.g., Ewing, 596 F.2d at 396 (“Where no single error or omission of 
counsel, standing alone, significantly impairs the defense, the district court may nonetheless find 
unfairness and thus, prejudice emanating from the totality of counsel’s errors and omissions.”). 
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together rather than the stricter standard of requiring each one alone to 
prejudice the defendant. By addressing this circuit discrepancy, the 
Supreme Court will ensure citizens have the same Sixth Amendment 
rights throughout the country. Part I provides background information 
of the development and history of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in our nation.23 Part II analyzes the circuit split regarding the 
cumulative error doctrine by highlighting some concrete examples of 
the conflicting approaches.24 Part III urges the Supreme Court to take 
up the issue and proposes that the cumulative error doctrine should be 
available to defendants in the context of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.25 
I.   THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A.   The Right to Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to every defendant in a criminal 
trial the assistance of counsel. 26  However, this current protection 
evolved in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, as it originally only 
applied in federal courts. In 1942, the Supreme Court held that the 
Sixth Amendment only mandated the right to counsel in state courts 
when the circumstances indicated that a deprivation would “constitute 
a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of 
justice.”27 Even though the Supreme Court noted that the right to the 
aid of counsel was of a fundamental character encompassed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, it declined to extend 
the Sixth Amendment to the states in every criminal case.28 During this 
time period, “[c]ourts typically weighed the competing interests of the 
defendant and the State to decide whether to provide counsel.”29 Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See discussion infra Part I. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III. 
 26. See supra note 12. 
 27. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). 
 28. Id. at 461–62. 
 29. Jennifer N. Foster, Note, Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in Claims 
of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1994). This balancing process instructed 
6
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a defendant facing robbery charges who could not afford counsel likely 
would not have one appointed, but a defendant facing more serious 
charges, like murder or rape, would.30 
In 1963, the Supreme Court overruled its previous precedent not 
requiring assistance of counsel in all cases and explicitly decided that 
“the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases was obligatory on 
the states through the [Fourteenth] Amendment . . . .”31 The Supreme 
Court announced this rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, reasoning that the 
right to counsel was essential to the right to a fair trial.32 The Court 
rejected lower courts’ approach of examining on a case-by-case basis 
whether fairness dictated the need for counsel appointment and, 
instead, incorporated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
onto the states in all criminal cases.33 Quoting Justice Sutherland, the 
Supreme Court explained a defendant’s need for appointed counsel: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
                                                                                                                 
lower courts to determine on an ad-hoc basis whether “fundamental fairness” warranted appointment. 
Betts, 316 U.S. at 462. This has proved a difficult task for courts. Foster, supra, at 1377 (“Although the 
State had interests in conserving resources, preserving verdicts, and maintaining the integrity of its judicial 
system, the interests of the defendant were more difficult to ascertain. Courts often measured the 
defendant’s interest in obtaining counsel by the gravity and complexity of the charge and by the age and 
education of the defendant. These factors proved difficult for courts to identify at the outset of trial; as a 
result, appellate courts often inquired into the actual harm or prejudice the defendant suffered as the result 
of the denial of counsel.”). 
 30. Betts, 316 U.S. at 457. In Betts, the defendant was indicted for robbery in Carroll County, 
Maryland. Id. at 456. At his arraignment, he informed the judge he could not afford to employ counsel, 
and he requested that counsel be appointed for him. Id. at 457. “The judge advised him that this could not 
be done as it was not the practice in Carroll County to appoint counsel for indigent defendants save in 
prosecutions for murder and rape.” Id. 
 31. Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application of Sixth Amendment Right to 
Counsel—Supreme Court Cases, 33 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, 3 (2009); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339. 
 32. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. Here, the defendant was charged in a Florida state court with breaking 
and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor, which is a felony offense under Florida 
law. Id. at 336. The defendant appeared at his arraignment without funds to employ a lawyer, and he 
requested the court to appoint counsel for him. Id. at 337. The following colloquy took place: 
The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this 
case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel 
to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, 
but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case. 
The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented 
by Counsel. 
Id. 
 33. Id. at 342–45. The Supreme Court already had extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to 
all felony defendants in federal courts. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–68 (1938). 
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did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is 
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper 
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because 
he does not know how to establish his innocence.34 
As this Sixth Amendment right to assistance grew, so did the right 
to quality assistance.35 
B.   The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases 
Since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel effectuates the due 
process right to a fair trial, it is not enough to just have counsel 
formally appointed or nearby during the trial.36 As the accused’s right 
to counsel in every criminal trial developed in this country, so did their 
right to quality assistance; the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). For a 
reflection on Justice Sutherland’s legacy on the bench, see Samuel R. Olken, Justice Sutherland 
Reconsidered, 62 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2009). Olken references many of the opinions by Justice Sutherland 
within the scope of this note: 
Sutherland’s opinion in Powell v. Alabama exemplifies his heightened sensitivity to the 
problems factions pose in the democratic process. . . . Though relatively narrow in scope, 
Powell is a critical link in the chain of Supreme Court precedent that culminated in the 
more inclusive incorporation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases 
recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright. 
Id. at 690. 
 35. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 
446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). 
 36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“[A] person who happens to be a 
lawyer . . . present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the [Sixth Amendment’s] 
constitutional command.”); Avery, 308 U.S. at 446 (announcing that the right to counsel “cannot be 
satisfied by mere formal appointment” and could be violated where counsel is denied the opportunity to 
confer or consult with the accused). 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol30/iss3/5
2014] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 867 
became a constitutional right to “effective counsel.”37 The Court first 
suggested that counsel must perform “effectively” in Powell v. 
Alabama, in which the trial court did not appoint defense counsel until 
just before trial.38 This day-of appointment of counsel, allowing little 
time to prepare a defense, “amount[ed] to a denial of effective and 
substantial” assistance.39 Cases following the early articulation of the 
“effective” standard largely consisted of due process claims, where the 
government interfered in some way with defense counsel and hindered 
counsel’s ability to be effective. 40  Those cases’ interpretations of 
“effective assistance” largely focused on courts’ actions in depriving 
the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel, rather than 
the counsel himself depriving the defendant by providing inadequate 
legal assistance.41 
In 1970 with McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court cemented 
the Powell standard that the right to counsel is the “right to effective 
assistance of counsel” in a context where a defendant claimed he 
received inadequate legal assistance, as opposed to arguing that the 
government’s interference rendered his representation ineffective.42 
The Supreme Court, however, failed to provide substantive guidance 
in evaluating whether the constitutional requirement of effective 
                                                                                                                 
 37. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. Strickland elaborated on the reasoning for such a proposition: 
“The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel’s 
playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce the just results.” 466 U.S. 
at 685. Therefore, an attorney must be effective in order to ensure that the trial is fair and to uphold the 
adversarial process. Id. 
 38. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53, 71. In Powell, the defendants were two black men charged with raping two 
white women. Id. at 49. The trials were held separately, but the outcomes were the same. Id. The juries 
found them guilty and sentenced them to death. Id. at 50. 
 39. Id. at 53. The constitutional duty to appoint counsel “is not discharged by an assignment at such a 
time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of 
the case.” Id. at 71. 
 40. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 619 (1972) (requiring that defendant be first 
witness); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 592 (1961) (barring direct examination of defendant except 
at the discretion of the trial judge). 
 41. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683 (noting the difference between “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel 
claims and government interference rendering defense counsel ineffective). 
 42. McMann, 397 U.S. at 763–64. In McMann, three defendants each claimed they received ineffective 
assistance of counsel when their respective counsels encouraged them to accept guilty pleas. Id. at 362–
64. The Court, citing Powell v. Alabama, noted that “[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel 
is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 771 n.14. 
9
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assistance had been met; instead it left to the lower courts the task of 
defining the minimum level of competence the Constitution requires.43 
Before the proper standards were articulated in Strickland, state 
courts and lower federal courts mostly continued to evaluate 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims as they had been doing despite 
McMann.44 The first common test that evolved focused on whether the 
defendant’s deprivation of effective assistance of counsel ultimately 
resulted in a fundamentally unfair proceeding.45 This prejudice-based 
test gradually emerged as the “farce and mockery” standard that 
controlled in federal courts.46 Under this standard, “[t]he defendant 
had to prove that, during the course of the trial, counsel’s 
representation—either through omissions, failure to call witnesses, 
insufficient preparation, and the like—was so incompetent as to 
render” the proceedings a farce or mockery. 47  Courts found this 
standard unworkable because the high burden on the defendant to 
prove counsel’s ineffectiveness converted the trial into a “farce;” 
because of the vagueness of this standard, courts abandoned the test.48 
The appellate courts did not wait until the Supreme Court expressly 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 771 (arguing that the standard for defense counsel competence “should be left to the good 
sense and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and 
that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing 
defendants in criminal cases in their courts”). 
 44. Although McMann cemented the standard, it did not affect the way lower courts evaluated 
effective assistance of counsel claims because of the lack of guidance provided. For an in-depth discussion 
on the history of federal courts’ interpretations of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, see Richard P. 
Rhodes, Jr., Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant’s Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 121 (1992). 
 45. Foster, supra note 29, at 1377; Rhodes, supra note 44, at 127. 
 46. Rhodes, supra note 44, at 127. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 
1974) (“In reviewing this Circuit’s treatment of ‘effective assistance of counsel,’ we have found numerous 
assertions of the ‘farce and mockery’ standard . . . .”). 
 47. Rhodes, supra note 44, at 127 (“This standard exemplified the prevailing notion that, except in the 
most egregious of circumstances, the verdicts of otherwise fair criminal proceedings should never serve a 
subordinate role to a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”). 
 48. By 1970, around the time of the McMann decision, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals expressly invalidated the farce and mockery standard. Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). The District of 
Columbia Circuit Court then instituted the “gross incompetence standard.” Id. “If the defendant could 
establish that the gross incompetence of defense counsel precluded the mounting of an effective defense, 
then a sentence reversal would follow.” Rhodes, supra note 44, at 128. 
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rejected the “the farce and mockery test” in 1978 to develop a different 
standard.49 
As federal appellate courts began rejecting the farce and mockery 
test, the circuits developed a variety of approaches to evaluate 
ineffective claims that involved some sort of “reasonableness” 
standard.50  For example, during this time period, the Fifth Circuit 
utilized “the reasonably competent attorney rule,” which evaluated 
whether counsel provided “reasonably effective assistance.” 51  The 
First, Second, and Tenth Circuits similarly required counsel to provide 
“reasonably competent assistance.”52 The Sixth Circuit emphasized an 
ad-hoc approach and asked if the representation was “reasonably 
effective assistance under the particular facts and circumstances of the 
case.” 53  Some circuits looked to professional norms in evaluating 
whether a defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel; 
the Seventh Circuit looked for a “minimum standard of professional 
representation.” 54  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit required defense 
counsel to exhibit “customary skills and diligence that a reasonably 
competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.”55 
Two years prior to Strickland, the Eleventh Circuit defined the right to 
effective counsel as “the right to counsel reasonably likely to render 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the farce and mockery test). 
The Fourth Circuit noted confusion among the lower courts about which standard to apply: 
We implicitly departed from the farce and mockery test when, in Coles v. Peyton, . . . we 
imposed specific requirements for counsel’s preparation of his client’s defense. Coles has 
been cited frequently as offering an improved measure for counsel’s performance. 
Nevertheless, some of our subsequent opinions quoted the [farce and mockery] test, and 
district courts, justifiably relying on them, have continued to apply it. . . . Since Coles, we 
have usually judged effective representation by determining whether counsel furnished 
reasonably adequate services instead of inquiring whether the representation was so poor 
as to make a farce of the trial. Be that as it may, our ambivalence has persisted long enough. 
We now expressly disavow the farce and mockery of justice test which we approved in 
Root v. Cunningham . . . . 
Id. at 543 (citations omitted). 
 50. Rhodes, supra note 44, at 128. 
 51. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960). The Fifth Circuit noted that a defendant is 
not entitled to an “errorless counsel,” and the counsel will not be “judged ineffective by hindsight.” Id. 
 52. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 153 (2d. Cir 1983); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 276 
(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1122 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 53. Wilson v. Cowan, 578 F.2d 166, 166–68 (6th Cir. 1978) (stressing the background facts of the 
case against which the attorney made his decisions). 
 54. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 55. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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and rendering reasonably effective assistance.”56 Most appellate courts 
called for a showing of harm in addition to the unreasonable errors.57 
Although appellate courts unanimously utilized some sort of 
reasonableness test in weighing ineffective assistance claims, the 
circuit courts applied their own particular standard to define the term, 
leading to a lack of uniformity.58 Finally, in Strickland v. Washington 
in 1984, the Supreme Court elaborated on the meaning of the 
constitutional requirement of effective assistance of counsel and 
articulated the two-prong deficiency and prejudice test for federal and 
state courts to uniformly apply.59 As mentioned, the Supreme Court 
held a defendant meets the deficiency prong by showing his counsel’s 
performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”60 In 
order to meet the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that the 
deficient performance likely deprived him of a fair trial. 61 
Unfortunately, a deep circuit split has emerged regarding the 
applicability of the cumulative error doctrine in the context of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. May a defendant total 
together counsel’s alleged errors to determine that such a performance, 
when viewed in the aggregate, deprived him of the right to a fair trial? 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 804 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 57. See id. at 805 (“[R]elief is proper only where a showing of prejudice accompanies the initial and 
distinct determination of ineffective assistance. This is true even in those cases where counsel’s 
preparation and investigation have been adjudged woefully inadequate.”). But cf. Moore v. United States, 
432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (“[T]he ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his 
counsel’s act or omission, but whether counsel’s performance was at the level of normal competency. 
That the client was prejudiced by a failure in performance is of course evidentiary on the issue.”). 
 58. See Rhodes, supra note 44, at 128–30. 
 59. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“In giving meaning to the requirement [of 
effective assistance] . . . we must take its purpose—to ensure a fair trial—as the guide.”). Recall, the 
Supreme Court had already recognized that the right to counsel is “the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 60. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. 
 61. Id. at 694. 
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II.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A.   Circuits Rejecting the Cumulative Error Doctrine 
In 1998, the Fourth Circuit proudly rejected the cumulative error 
doctrine in Fisher v. Angelone.62 Ensuring no confusion, the Fourth 
Circuit announced: “To the extent this Court has not specifically stated 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims . . . must be reviewed 
individually, rather than collectively, we do so now.”63 Previously, the 
trial court convicted David Fisher of capital murder, determined he 
was a danger to society, and sentenced him to death.64 Following his 
conviction, Fisher petitioned the Fourth Circuit for habeas relief, 
enumerating five specific errors defense counsel made that deprived 
him of effective assistance of counsel.65 Fisher claimed his counsel’s 
alleged errors were: (1) “failing to challenge the admissibility of [] 
taped conversations with a government witness”; (2) “failing to 
develop and present evidence to rebut the aggravating factor of future 
dangerousness”; (3) “failing to develop and present additional 
mitigating evidence”; (4) “opening the door to evidence of his parole 
eligibility status”; and (5) “failing to object when the burden was 
placed on defendant to prove that he should not be sentenced to 
death.” 66  Fisher also had a separate enumerated claim that the 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998). For an equally proud example of a court 
accepting the cumulative error doctrine, see Wisconsin v. Thiel, 665 N.W.2d 305, 322 (Wis. 2003). 
Just as a single mistake in an attorney’s otherwise commendable representation may be so 
serious as to impugn the integrity of a proceeding, the cumulative effect of several deficient 
acts or omissions may, in certain instances, also undermine a reviewing court’s confidence 
in the outcome of a proceeding. Therefore, in determining whether a defendant has been 
prejudiced as a result of counsel’s deficient performance, we may aggregate the effects of 
multiple incidents of deficient performance in determining whether the overall impact of 
the deficiencies satisfied the standard for a new trial under Strickland. 
Id. 
 63. Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852. 
 64. Id. at 838. Fisher killed his friend to cash in on a life insurance policy he had taken out on the 
friend. Id. at 839. Fisher successfully staged the murder scene to look like a hunting accident; however, 
the life insurance company, reluctant to pay the claim, began an investigation of the circumstances 
surrounding the death and became suspicious of a cover-up. Id. at 840. 
 65. Id. at 843. 
 66. Id. 
13
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combined effect of these five errors rendered his counsel’s assistance 
ineffective.67 
After addressing each individual error and determining that each 
error alone did not prejudice the defendant, the Fourth Circuit denied 
Fisher’s habeas relief.68 Even though the court dismissed these errors 
one by one as non-prejudicial, the court engaged in a rather lengthy 
discussion regarding each error—implying the court may have 
considered at least some of these errors significant.69 The court then 
held that, under Strickland, it could not consider the errors collectively 
to determine whether Fisher was prejudiced.70  The Fourth Circuit 
likened the cumulative error doctrine for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to adding the alleged errors of a trial court together.71 
Although in comparing the claims and announcing the rule, the Fourth 
Circuit failed to explain the rule’s reasoning.72 The court stated that it 
“has long been the practice of this Court [to individually assess 
claims]” and “[i]n so holding, we are in agreement with the majority 
of our sister circuits that have considered the issue.”73 By rooting its 
rationale for rejecting the cumulative error doctrine in precedent, citing 
the Supreme Court as well as the court’s own earlier decisions, the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 852. Moreover, the court conceded that defense counsel failed to articulate objection grounds 
for evidence that was inadmissible but admitted by the trial judge. Id. at 849. 
 69. See Fisher, 163 F.3d at 849–50. 
 70. Id. at 852 (“[I]t would be odd, to say the least, to conclude that those same actions [individual 
errors], when considered collectively, deprived Fisher of a fair trial.”). 
 71. Id. at 852 (citing Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
 72. See generally id. at 851–54 (explaining only that the rule is in agreement with the majority of sister 
circuits). 
 73. Id. at 852. The Circuit Court then cited the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit 
as authority for its proposition. Id. at 853. However, the Ninth Circuit does permit cumulative errors to 
factor into a prejudice determination. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defense may be prejudiced as a result of 
cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance). The Ninth Circuit totaled 
counsel’s alleged errors, even before Strickland. See, e.g., Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 
1979). For a different interpretation of Fisher, see United States v. Russell, 34 F. App’x 927 (4th Cir. 
2002). Without ruling on the applicability thereof, the court concluded that Fisher did not support the 
district court’s rejection of the cumulative-effect claim where the district court assumed, but did not 
decide, that the defense attorney’s performance was deficient; if his attorney’s performance was deficient, 
“cumulatively, [defendant] could show prejudice.” Id. at 928. 
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court neglected to explain why this rule properly comports with 
Strickland.74 
While the accuracy of the Fisher court’s statement that most circuits 
reject the cumulative error doctrine is questionable—because the court 
cited circuits that do cumulate counsel’s errors for this proposition—
the Fourth Circuit is in agreement with the Eighth, Tenth, and Sixth 
Circuits on the issue.75 The Eighth Circuit has expressly held that an 
attorney’s acts or omissions “that are not unconstitutional individually 
cannot be added together to create a constitutional violation.” 76 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that “cumulative-error analysis 
evaluates only [the] effect of matters determined to be error, not [the] 
cumulative effect of non-errors.”77 The courts rejecting cumulative 
error analysis often cite Strickland or other precedent in lieu of an 
explanation.78 However, in one early Tenth Circuit decision on the 
cumulative error matter, the court rooted its denial of the doctrine in 
its fear of “uncontrolled discretion in the appellate courts.” 79 
Foreseeing appellate court decisions becoming unpredictable and an 
influx of appeals from criminal defendants demanding a new trial on 
the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors, the court announced that each 
alleged error alone must rise to be prejudicial error.80 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852–53. Other courts’ reasoning for rejecting the cumulative error doctrine 
is also grounded, without explanation, in Strickland or earlier precedent. See, e.g., Wainwright v. 
Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 75. See, e.g., Sutton v. Bell, 645 F.3d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 2011); Wainwright, 80 F.3d at 1233; Jones, 
59 F.3d at 147. 
 76. Wainwright, 80 F.3d at 1233. 
 77. Jones, 59 F.3d at 147 (citing United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
 78. See, e.g., Wainwright, 80 F.3d at 1233. In Wainwright, the defendant asserted that even if the court 
rejected each claimed error individually, the cumulative effect deprived him of a fair trial. Id. However, 
the court rejected this proposed analysis in light of Strickland. Id. 
 79. United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990). 
There is a substantial body of constitutional, statutory, and common law which defines the 
various types of error that can lead to reversal of a defendant’s criminal conviction. The 
discretion of an appellate court to reverse a verdict is limited by those legal 
rules . . . . [D]iscretion of a court applying a cumulative-error analysis in the absence of 
actual error would not be similarly controlled. 
Id. 
 80. Id. 
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B.   Circuits Adopting the Cumulative Error Doctrine 
In 1984, Frank Rodriguez was convicted of murder in the second 
degree in a federal district court and “sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of [twenty] years to life.”81 Rodriguez petitioned the Second 
Circuit for habeas relief, enumerating six specific defense counsel 
errors that deprived him of effective assistance. 82  Rodriguez’s 
ineffective assistance claims consisted of his counsel’s: 
(1) failing to object to the jury note not being read into the record; 
(2) failing to object to the supplemental jury charge; (3) failing to 
move for a mistrial based on a juror’s incompetence; (4) failing to 
investigate whether the prosecution had searched for the 
photograph identified by [the eyewitness]; (5) failing to 
investigate possible “favorable” statements made by [another 
witness] . . . ; and (6) failing to have an investigator photograph 
the crime scene.83 
Unlike the defendant in Fisher, Rodriguez declined to specifically 
ask the court to cumulate the errors trial counsel made in his pleadings, 
but, nonetheless, the court did so on its own.84 Just as the Fourth 
Circuit in Fisher used Strickland to explain why it could not add 
counsel’s errors together, the Second Circuit used Strickland to explain 
why it should add counsel’s errors together—without even being asked 
to do so.85 
The Second Circuit argued that lower courts “should have been 
given the opportunity to consider all the circumstances and the 
cumulative effect of all the claims as a whole.”86 Although the Second 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 535 (2d Cir. 1991). Rodriguez was arrested and charged with 
murder based on eyewitness identification. Id. The eyewitness “testified that she recognized Rodriguez 
from the neighborhood.” Id. at 536. “Based almost entirely on [this] testimony, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 538. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir. 1998); Rodriguez, 928 F.2d at 538. 
 86. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d at 538 (quoting Grady v. LeFevre, 846 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Circuit remanded the petition to the district court to be adjudicated on 
the merits, the circuit court first provided some guidance: “Since 
Rodriguez’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the 
cumulative effect of all of counsel’s actions, all his allegations of 
ineffective assistance should be reviewed together.”87 Interestingly, 
the Second Circuit cited Strickland for adopting the cumulative error 
doctrine—just as the circuit courts that rejected the doctrine did.88 The 
circuit court then elaborated even more favorably on the cumulative 
error doctrine: “Even if Rodriguez’s claims, evaluated individually, 
might not amount to a due process violation sufficient to require 
habeas relief, nevertheless, given the number of questionable 
circumstances in this case . . . the [] court should be given an 
opportunity to carefully review all of Rodriguez’s claims together.”89 
The circuit court’s rationale—again similar to those rejecting the 
doctrine—seems to be rooted in an unexplained precedent.90 
The Second Circuit’s cumulative approach aligns with the Seventh 
Circuit.91 In Williams v. Washington, the Seventh Circuit held that a 
defendant may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s 
individual acts or omissions was prejudicial. 92  These circuits are 
joined by the Ninth Circuit, which totaled a counsel’s alleged errors in 
evaluating effective assistance of counsel claims both before and after 
Strickland.93 The Ninth Circuit still follows the principle it outlined in 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. The term “unexplained precedent” is used to describe the implicit reasoning provided by circuit 
courts for and against the cumulative error doctrine, as both cite Strickland and point to the same specific 
language. Arguably, Strickland is simply silent on the exact issue. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 91. Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995). Petitioner was convicted of sexual 
assault on a child and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Id. at 675. Petitioner asserted on habeas appeal 
that she had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at her trial. Id. 
 92. Id. at 682. “Counsel’s lack of familiarity with the case, combined with his failure to investigate, 
provided [defendant] with a trial significantly different than the trial she might have received if 
represented by a competent attorney.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the word “combined” 
demonstrates their adherence to the cumulative deficiency doctrine. The Court then concluded, “[t]here 
exists, in short, a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. We believe that 
counsel’s various failures have called the fairness of her proceeding into question.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 93. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding for purposes of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defense may be prejudiced as a result of cumulative impact of 
multiple deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance). As mentioned supra note 73, the Ninth Circuit 
17
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Ewing v. Williams, six years before Strickland: “Where no single error 
or omission of counsel, standing alone, significantly impairs the 
defense, the district court may nonetheless find unfairness and thus, 
prejudice emanating from the totality of counsel’s errors and 
omissions.”94 The Ninth Circuit focused on the amount and severity of 
the alleged errors at issue, and the court reasoned that these combined 
errors certainly could deprive a defendant of the right to a fair trial—
what Strickland sought to enforce.95 If the court finds a “plethora” of 
grave errors, as a matter of judicial economy, it will engage in the 
cumulative error analysis, eliminating the need to determine if each 
error is prejudicial.96 Such a rule necessarily relies on the facts of each 
case. The Seventh Circuit’s rationale for supporting the cumulative 
error doctrine is similar: “Assessments of prejudice are necessarily 
fact-intensive determinations peculiar to the circumstances of each 
case.”97 Therefore, if multiple errors combine to be prejudicial in a 
certain case, and these errors deprived the defendant of a right to a fair 
trial, then there is no reason not to consider them together.98 
C.   The Eleventh Circuit: Calling Attention to the Lack of Supreme 
Court Guidance 
Recently, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with deciding the 
availability of the cumulative error doctrine for a defendant in Forrest 
                                                                                                                 
totaled counsel’s alleged errors, even before Strickland. See, e.g., Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 396 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
 94. Ewing, 596 F.2d at 396. “And even where, as here, several specific errors are found, it is the duty 
of the Court to make a finding as to prejudice, although this finding may either be ‘cumulative’ or focus 
on one discrete blunder in itself prejudicial.” Id. at 395–96. 
 95. Harris ex rel. Ramseyer, 64 F.3d at 1438. 
 96. Id. In declining to engage in the analysis from an efficiency standpoint, the court did hedge its bet 
by explaining, “[b]ut by no means do we rule out that some of the deficiencies were individually 
prejudicial.” Id. at 1439. 
 97. Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 684 (7th Cir. 1995); Nealy v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1178–
79 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 98. Williams, 59 F.3d at 684 (“Here, counsel’s failure to protect [defendant] from the effect of [a] 
confession, combined with his failure to prevent the prosecution from using [evidence] to buttress her 
credibility, produced a trial significantly different than the one that [defendant] should have received. We 
are convinced that, absent counsel’s errors, there exists a reasonable probability that the factfinder would 
have had a reasonable doubt concerning [the defendant’s] guilt.”). The language the court uses and the 
lack of concrete analysis implies a type of “we know it when we see it” use of the cumulative error 
doctrine. 
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v. Florida Department of Corrections.99 Matthew Forrest was charged 
with two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm and sentenced to 
twenty years imprisonment.100 After this conviction, Forrest argued he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to 
call an alibi witness, along with numerous other errors.101 The other 
alleged errors included counsel’s failure to: (1) depose the alibi 
witness; (2) file a motion to suppress the ballistics report; (3) examine 
files presented by the prosecution; (4) call a rebuttal ballistics expert; 
and (5) ask for a continuance. 102  In addition to each specific 
enumerated error, Forrest pleaded that, when viewed in the aggregate, 
these errors amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.103 
The Eleventh Circuit began the analysis by stating: “The Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed the applicability of the cumulative 
error doctrine in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.” 104  After noting the lack of Supreme Court precedent, and 
without mention of Strickland, the Eleventh Circuit cast doubt on the 
cumulative error doctrine by quoting another Supreme Court case on 
the Sixth Amendment.105  In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme 
Court explained “there is generally no basis for finding a Sixth 
Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors 
of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt.”106 It 
appears the Eleventh Circuit focused on the term “specific” because a 
fair reading could also cut the other way by focusing on the pluralized 
term “errors.” The court equated guilt finding in Cronic with the 
prejudicial prong of Strickland.107 Both Supreme Court cases were 
decided on the same day.108 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Forrest v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 342 F. App’x 560, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 100. Id. at 562. After a dispute over money and personal property, Forrest and a (former) friend got into 
an altercation in a neighborhood street that ended with Forrest firing a shotgun at the friend. Id. at 561. 
 101. Id. at 564 n.6. On the day the alibi witness was supposed to testify, “[d]efense counsel, without 
explanation, responded, ‘Your Honor, the Defense would rest at this time.’” Id. at 562. 
 102. Id. at 564 n.6. 
 103. Id. at 564. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Forrest, 342 F. App’x at 564–65 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984)). 
 106. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.26. Cronic held that it is not enough to show that the lawyer was not an 
experienced criminal lawyer; the defendant must show specific errors. Id. at 665. 
 107. Forrest, 342 F. App’x at 564–65. 
 108. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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Without strict guidance on how to assess the cumulative error claim, 
the Eleventh Circuit admitted that Cronic was not directly on point and 
deferred to the Florida State Supreme Court, which had refused to 
cumulate counsel’s errors.109 The court assumed, without deciding, 
that the cumulative error doctrine would not be available to a defendant 
in light of the language in Cronic, but the court actually denied 
Forrest’s claims because it believed “the state court’s holding [was 
not] an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.”110 
Supreme Court precedent requires this deference; in Williams v. 
Taylor, the Court held federal habeas corpus relief from a state court 
conviction was available only when the state court decision was based 
on an “unreasonable application” of standards “clearly established” by 
the Supreme Court in Strickland and other cases.111 
Since 2009, the Supreme Court has taken up more cases dealing 
with ineffective assistance of counsel claims than ever before.112 The 
time could just be right for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit 
discrepancy on the cumulative error doctrine.113 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Forrest, 342 F. App’x at 565 (“[Defendant] raised his cumulative error argument before the state 
court. The state court concluded that none of [defendant’s] alleged individual errors amounts to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Thus, the state denied [defendant’s] claim of cumulative error by relying on the 
Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370 (Fla. 2005), which stated that ‘where 
the individual claims of error alleged are . . . without merit, the claim of cumulative error also necessarily 
fails.’”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (interpreting an 
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. 1996) enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996). 
 112. Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere 
Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (2010). The Court devoted a remarkable 
fifteen percent of its already limited time during the 2009 term to cases on the topic including twelve 
argued cases and five per curiam decisions. Id. at 1500, 1502. “The law governing lawyers is a sometimes 
ignored, but vitally important body of law, essential to the proper function of our justice system and our 
democratic form of government.” Id. at 1502. 
 113. Why the recent focus on the law of lawyering? Knake argues the Supreme Court is considering 
constitutional implications when agreeing to hear cases involving bad lawyering. Id. at 1570 (“[T]he 
overwhelming majority of the lawyering cases that sparked the Court’s interest during the 2009 term 
involved constitutional challenges.”). During the 2009 term, the Court heard ten cases involving 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. These cases require the Court to “revisit the constitutional 
rights and safeguards guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal trial.” Id. If such willingness truly exists, a 
cumulative error case could be a vehicle for a re-examination of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel. 
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III.   RESOLVING THE SPLIT AND ENSURING UNIFORMITY 
At the first available opportunity, the Supreme Court should grant a 
certiorari petition in order to resolve the circuit split over whether the 
prejudice arising from multiple errors by defense counsel should be 
cumulated to determine whether counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance under the Strickland v. Washington standard. 114  The 
Supreme Court should adopt the approach of the Second, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits in favor of allowing a defendant to aggregate defense 
counsel’s alleged errors to meet Strickland’s prejudice prong.115 By 
adopting the cumulative error doctrine in the context of ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, the Court will clarify the original text of 
its Strickland precedent and effectuate the founders’ intent of the Sixth 
Amendment. 
First, Strickland supports the proposition that a convicted 
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be 
evaluated by looking at the prejudicial effect of all counsel’s errors 
combined. The Supreme Court held in Strickland that a defendant 
meets the deficient performance prong of the test by “showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”116 
By pluralizing “errors” in articulating what constitutes a counsel’s 
deficient performance, the Supreme Court acknowledged a situation 
where a defense counsel makes repeated missteps that together could 
deprive a defendant of his constitutional right to effective assistance. 
Circuit courts denying the defendant of an opportunity to aggregate 
counsel’s alleged errors have disregarded Strickland’s command to 
consider all the circumstances of the claim when examining counsel’s 
performance.117 
Although a federal court could consider each alleged error on an 
individual basis and still technically perform a totality of the 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
 115. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 116. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. at 688 (“In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”). 
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circumstances inquiry, the Court’s repeated use of errors, as a plural, 
suggests a broader intent for the ineffective assistance analysis. The 
Supreme Court even notes that a defendant making a claim must 
identify “the acts or omissions of counsel” that are alleged to have been 
the result of unreasonable judgment.118 Once more with its language, 
the Court is anticipating a claim that arises because of a series of 
errors—whether they are steps done wrong or multiple steps not 
done.119 
This interpretation of allowing multiple errors to factor into the 
analysis as one claim is harmonized with the Supreme Court’s 
explanation in Strickland of how a defendant shows that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense: “[t]his requires showing that 
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”120 This language has guided the 
circuit courts that adopted the cumulative error doctrine. 121  For 
example, the Ninth Circuit accepted the cumulative error doctrine 
because Strickland requires the focus of the inquiry to be on the 
fundamental fairness of the trial being challenged.122 Thus, if a court 
finds multiple errors combined rendered the proceeding unfair, it 
obviates the need to analyze the prejudicial effect of each error and 
still comports with Strickland.123 
The Supreme Court in Strickland even framed the prejudice prong 
in an issue statement for the lower courts: “[W]hether there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would 
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”124 Again, the Court 
chose to pluralize errors—referring to all the errors together, not each 
error separately—acknowledging a situation where the severity of 
multiple missteps rises to the level of a constitutional violation. 
Honoring the Supreme Court’s language in Strickland is essential 
because of the legitimate impact that the accumulation issue can have 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. at 687 (emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 122. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
 123. See, e.g., id. at 1439. 
 124. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (emphasis added). 
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on a case. As discussed above, the Second Circuit in Rodriguez v. Hoke 
applied the doctrine in evaluating the defendant’s six alleged errors of 
defense counsel. 125  Each claim articulated a certain omission by 
counsel.126 Isolating one omission and proving that the outcome of the 
trial may have been different had it been completed is a daunting task. 
But when one considers the six alleged errors, which of course must 
be supported by the record, counsel’s performance becomes clearer, 
and the court gains a more accurate context—reverting back to the goal 
of simply ensuring a fair trial that is made possible by effective 
attorneys. 
Circuit courts denying the defendant the ability to cumulate 
counsel’s alleged errors because of judicial economy concerns are 
underestimating the strong safeguards Strickland constructed in order 
for a defendant to present a viable claim. Circuit courts, like the Tenth 
Circuit, fear an influx of claims from defendants if they adopt the 
cumulative error doctrine.127 These circuit courts should be comforted 
in the strong deference Strickland requires in evaluating a claim: 
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.” 128  Moreover, courts must analyze defense counsel’s 
performance without the wisdom of hindsight.129 This edict prevents 
courts from “Monday morning quarterbacking” and reduces the 
chances a judge would try to substitute his or her own wisdom for that 
of defense counsel.130 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991). Rodriguez’s allegations consisted of: 
(1) failing to object to the jury note not being read into the record; (2) failing to object to 
the supplemental jury charge; (3) failing to move for a mistrial based on a juror’s 
incompetence; (4) failing to investigate whether the prosecution had searched for the 
photograph identified by [the eyewitness]; (5) failing to investigate possible “favorable” 
statements made by [another witness] . . . ; and (6) failing to have an investigator 
photograph the crime scene. 
Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See discussion supra note 79. 
 128. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added). “It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel’s assistance after conviction . . . .” Id. 
 129. Id. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct . . . .” Id. 
 130. Empirical data shows the safeguards’ success. In the immediate wake of Strickland, a 1988 law 
review survey of the case law on ineffective assistance of counsel claims showed that ineffectiveness 
claims were sustained in a minuscule 4.3% of cases. Calhoun, supra note 8, at 414 n.11, apps. at 458–61. 
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An argument fearing unpredictability of appellate court decisions on 
the cumulative claims also lacks merit.131 Foremost, unpredictability 
with a circuit split on the cumulative error doctrine is already present. 
But, Strickland sets out rigid enough standards that will confine 
decisions to limited variation. In addition to the reasonableness 
standard and deferential treatment to counsel conduct, the biggest 
safeguard against an influx of ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
and appellate unpredictability is that the defendant must “affirmatively 
prove prejudice.” 132  The defendant, already convicted and likely 
incarcerated, must prove that the errors together would undermine 
confidence in the trial’s outcome.133 This high burden ensures only 
meritorious claims will likely succeed.134 
Finally, permitting the cumulative error doctrine in ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims effectuates the intent of the Sixth 
Amendment. As a result of the circuit split, criminal defendants in 
different parts of the country are subject to varying levels of Sixth 
Amendment protection.135 The Sixth Amendment ensures a defendant 
will have the assistance of counsel to mount a defense. 136  The 
provision ensuring the assistance of counsel is mentioned in 
conjunction with rights our founders wished the accused to “enjoy”: 
the right to a speedy trial, the right to an impartial jury, the right to be 
informed of the accusations against them, and the right to confront 
their accusers.137 These provisions help protect the accused’s basic 
right to due process.138  Allowing ineffective assistance of counsel 
                                                                                                                 
In six of the twelve federal circuits, no defendant prevailed in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Id. app. I. 
 131. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
 132. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. “The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent, 
attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.” Id. The Court noted the variety of 
ways errors could come before them and placed the burden on the defendant to show how those errors 
were unreasonable. Id. 
 133. Id. at 694. 
 134. Most of the cases (43.3%) rejecting the defendant’s claim that he received ineffective assistance 
of counsel did so on the ground that prejudice had not been shown. Calhoun, supra note 8, at 433. Because 
Strickland requires adherence to both prongs of the test, almost half of the cases never even addressed the 
adequacy of the defense lawyer’s performance. Id. 
 135. See discussion supra Part II. 
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85. 
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claims based on the cumulative effect of counsel’s alleged errors only 
effectuates these basic due process rights. There is no ascertainable 
constitutional distinction between several errors that likely affected the 
outcome of the trial versus one egregious error that likely affected the 
outcome of the trial. As long as it likely affected the outcome of the 
trial, courts should be concerned with the legal assistance provided. 
Asking courts to consider whether the combination of counsel’s 
alleged errors prejudiced the defendant promotes a totality of the 
circumstances approach in evaluating our constitutional rights, as 
opposed to a strictly limited, individual analysis, piecemeal approach. 
Strickland, by instructing courts to consider all of the circumstances, 
affirms that this is the appropriate constitutional approach.139 
CONCLUSION 
Criminal defendants are receiving different Sixth Amendment 
protections across the country. 140  The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits expressly rejected the cumulative error doctrine in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims while the Second, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits adopted the doctrine. 141  Despite the lack of 
uniformity in their opinions, both the circuits rejecting the doctrine and 
the circuits adopting the doctrine cite Strickland as the authority for 
their positions.142 The Supreme Court should resolve the discrepancy 
to bolster their original goal of Strickland: uniformly enforcing the 
accused’s fundamental right to a fair trial.143 
The Supreme Court should adopt the approach of the circuits 
allowing a defendant to aggregate defense counsel’s alleged errors to 
meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.144 By adopting the cumulative 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Id. at 688 (“In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”). 
 140. See discussion supra Part II. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 144. See, e.g., Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defense may be prejudiced as a result of 
cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies in defense counsel’s performance). 
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error doctrine in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
the Supreme Court will clarify the original text of its Strickland 
precedent and effectuate the founders’ intent of the Sixth Amendment. 
“The right to effective counsel is in many ways the most fundamental 
of all constitutional protections; it is through counsel that all the other 
rights are asserted and preserved.” 145  By failing to resolve the 
cumulative error circuit split, the Supreme Court has reduced the 
standard of what it means to provide “effective assistance.” And an 
individual “whose counsel does not provide . . . effective 
representation may be no better off than the defendant who simply has 
no lawyer at all.”146 
                                                                                                                 
 145. Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 
1433, 1479 (1999). 
 146. Id. 
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